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INFINITE JEST: THE OTIOSE QUEST FOR COMPLETENESS IN 
VALIDATING INSOLVENCY JUDGMENTS
BRUCE A. MARKELL*
INTRODUCTION
Transnational bankruptcy has a core problem: how to reconcile and har-
monize the competing and differing laws of the various states in which fi-
nancially distressed debtors operate or have assets. A significant step 
towards resolving the harmonization problem occurred in 1997 with the 
promulgation of UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies 
(“Model Law”).1 Now adopted by over forty countries,2 including the United 
States,3 the Model Law provides a framework for cooperation.
This framework, however, is not based upon standardization of statutes, 
but on consensus as to the venue of centralized insolvency proceedings. The 
Model Law designates the state where the debtor’s center of main interests, 
or COMI, is located as the venue in which the main insolvency proceedings 
should occur.4 States where the debtor has an establishment—that is, “any 
place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic 
activity with human means and goods or services”5—can host “non-main” 
insolvency proceedings regarding the debtor,6 but those non-main proceed-
ings should defer and be ancillary to the main proceeding.7
Or at least that was the theory. Underlying the Model Law was an im-
plicit assumption that the court orders entered in the main proceeding would 
* Professor of Bankruptcy Law and Practice, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.
1. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, at 19, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactment-
e.pdf [hereinafter MODEL LAW]. Although the document bears a 2014 date, that reflects changes made to 
the Guide to Enactment. The text of the Model Law has not changed since 1997.
2. Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HQ4-GLCZ].
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32 (2012).
4. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 88 (“The interests and the authority of a representative of a foreign non-main pro-
ceeding are typically narrower than the interests and the authority of a representative of a foreign main 
proceeding, who normally seeks to gain control over all assets of the insolvent debtor.”).
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be respected in all other states in which the debtor had assets or operated, 
regardless of whether the debtor opened up an ancillary proceeding in those 
states.
That assumption has proved optimistic. In 2012, the United Kingdom’s 
Supreme Court, in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA,8 declined to recognize a default 
judgment entered by a United States court notwithstanding that the United 
States insolvency was a “main” proceeding. Rubin came as somewhat of a 
surprise, given earlier decisions of the English courts,9 and strong arguments 
that the universalism contained in Model Law itself permitted the United 
States court to enter the default judgment.10
Rubin applied common law principles.11 But the common law is not 
immovable. Statutes can and do change common law rules. That principle 
has caused UNCITRAL to reconvene its drafting group, and to begin work 
on a new model law that would address judgments entered in a main pro-
ceeding.12
That effort, the new Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Insolvency-Related Judgments (“Recognition Law”),13 is almost finished. It 
is also doomed. As this Article argues, the Recognition Law attempts to im-
pose uniform, substantive rules of judgment recognition through imposition 
of reciprocity of recognition. The drafters of the Model Law thought any 
efforts to impose uniform substantive law among nations would be ineffec-
tive.14 But even if now, more than twenty years after the promulgation of the 
8. [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from Eng.).
9. See, e.g., Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator 
Holdings PLC [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (appeal taken from Isle of Man); McGrath v. Riddell 
(In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd.), [2008] UKHL 21, [36] (Lord Hoffmann) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(explaining that English judges had for many years recognized a principle that bankruptcies should be 
unitary and universal).
10. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 746–
47 (2015).
11. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [91]; see also id. [108]–[110].
12. U.N. Secretariat, Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments: Draft Guide 
to Enactment of the Model Law, Note by the Secretariat, Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.151 (Sept. 20, 2017), http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenA-
gent&DS=a/cn.9/wg.v/wp.151&Lang=E [https://perma.cc/6TXQ-N9KE] [hereinafter Recognition Draft 
Guide to Enactment].
13. U.N. Secretariat, Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments: Draft Model 
Law, Note by the Secretariat, Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.150 (Sept. 19, 
2017), http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=a/cn.9/wg.v/wp.150&Lang=E 
[https://perma.cc/5WFD-5AYP] [hereinafter Recognition Law].
14. As noted in one of the documents leading to the formation of the working group that drafted 
the Model Law:
However, while recognizing the desirability of a workable system of cooperation between 
States in insolvency matters, it has also been pointed out in international discussions that it may 
be unrealistic to suppose that any principle of universality of insolvency proceedings could be 
attained at the global, or even at regional, level in the foreseeable future. It has been said that it 
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Model Law, and after the global environment has become more receptive to 
such efforts, there are good reasons to believe the Recognition Law, if en-
acted, will be ineffective.
My pessimism is based on the assertion that, to be effective, laws such 
as the Recognition Law must assume similarities of purpose and effect in the 
underlying legal systems that do not presently exist among states. Put another 
way, the provisions and strictures of judgments entered in a main proceeding 
must correlate and map to similar provisions and judgments in the country 
in which the judgment is sought to be enforced. In short, the judgments must 
translate well.
As this Article will show, some critical insolvency judgments do not 
translate well. This failure of translation will be shown through an examina-
tion of common provisions in debtor-in-possession financing orders in 
United States proceedings under chapter 11, followed by an extrapolation of 
how a non-United States court would attempt to implement and enforce those 
provisions outside of the United States. The Article concludes that the dis-
parities highlighted by this extrapolation illustrate and presage the ultimate 
futility in expecting the Recognition Law to achieve its stated aims.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE THUS FAR
As indicated in the introduction, a central problem in transnational in-
solvencies is efficiency. Businesses expand across borders with little regard 
to the changes crossing such borders entail. These changes affect many 
things, but in particular affect the remedies available and results achieved 
when the business faces financial distress. There was a time when the only 
legal response was to coordinate parallel insolvency proceedings among 
each nation in which the business operated, and to attempt to mitigate the 
differences in administration, priority, and reorganization policy each pre-
sented.15
In 1997, UNCITRAL sought to address this in its Model Law not by 
suggesting a uniform, substantive, global bankruptcy code, but through a 
process by which transnational insolvencies could be centered in one coun-
try, regardless of its substantive law. Put another way, the Model Law sought 
to reduce inefficiency by forcing adopting countries to adopt rules that point 
will continue to be unacceptable that interests and expectations arising under local law could 
be overridden by the effects of insolvency proceedings taking place elsewhere.
U.N. Secretariat, Possible Future Work: Cross-Border Insolvency, Note by the Secretariat, at 11, Comm’n
on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/378/Add.4, (June 23, 1993), http://daccess-ods.un.org/ac-
cess.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=a/cn.9/378/add.4&Lang=E [https://perma.cc/VW47-P85B].
15. See generally id.
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to one country, and one country only, as the source of the laws for resolving 
the financial distress of a global business. The Model Law follows this goal 
and selects COMI as the touchstone for choosing the location of the central 
insolvency proceeding.16
The Model Law was, and is, an avatar of universalism, the theory that 
insolvencies should be resolved by a single law or, if that is impossible, by a 
single court applying its insolvency law to resolve all creditor claims, regard-
less of where they arose.17 In many respects, the Model Law worked well, 
especially in coordinating the administration of complex transnational busi-
ness cases, and in allowing parties to gravitate toward countries whose laws 
were conducive or at least receptive to the restructuring terms agreed upon 
by the parties.18
But there are other phases of restructuring. Often, deals for the future 
turn on unwinding deals of the past. Avoiding, or as some call it, clawing 
back, pre-insolvency transactions that prefer some or were undervalued are 
often essential elements of a restructuring deal. Part of the universalist con-
ception is that such actions should be centered in the home court chosen by 
the Model Law. And some believed that, either by construction of non-spe-
cific sections of the Model Law or by application of common law reasoning, 
the goal of selecting one court to administer avoiding actions could over-
come objections based upon comity or presumptions against extraterritorial-
ity.19
A. Rubin
The progress towards the goal of centralization stumbled when, on De-
cember 14, 2007, a process server shoved legal papers through a mail slot at 
the headquarters of Eurofinance SA, in London, England.20 The papers re-
lated to a $160 million lawsuit filed in the Southern District of New York. 
16. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at 4.
17. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the 
United States of the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2013); Westbrook, 
supra note 10.
18. Westbrook, supra note 10, at 756–57.
19. See Edward R. Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance Actions: Lessons from Madoff, 9 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 163, 177–78 (2014) (“The foregoing analysis suggests that neither the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality nor international comity should be a barrier to clawing back pre-petition 
fraudulent transfers by a domestic debtor . . . .”).
20. Declaration of Paul Grove at 1–2, Rubin v. Roman (In re The Consumers Trust), Ch. 11 Case 
No. 05-60155 (REG), Adv. No. 07-03138 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2008), ECF No. 8. Service 
was accomplished “by placing the document [the complaint] through the letter box of the main entrance 
door of the registered office of [Eurofinance] in full view of any Director or office of the company re-
turning to the registered office.” Id. at 1–2.
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Eurofinance, a company registered in the British Virgin Islands, was alleged 
to have been a key participant in a scheme to bilk United States consumers.
Eurofinance never responded to the papers dropped off at its London 
office. At the request of one Rubin, the estate representative, Eurofinance’s 
default was taken, and it was served with that default by mail sent to the same 
address at which the papers had been left.21 Rubin then moved for and re-
ceived summary judgment on all claims, with service of the motion again 
achieved by shoving papers through the same mail slot.22 The New York 
bankruptcy court found that Eurofinance had been personally served in ac-
cordance with United States bankruptcy law, and thus found it had jurisdic-
tion over Eurofinance.23 The court then entered a judgment in favor of Rubin 
and against Eurofinance and others, in excess of $160 million.24
The judgment was brought overseas and sought to be enforced. That is 
when the universalist agenda began to unravel.
Sued on its home turf in an action to enforce the New York judgment, 
Eurofinance responded. It claimed that the default and summary proceedings 
in New York were without jurisdiction. And the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court ultimately agreed.25 Speaking primarily through the judgment of Lord 
Collins, the court rejected the notion that the Model Law applied to the issue. 
It declined to imbue the Model Law’s general rules of cooperation and em-
powerment with the specific power to impose a COMI court’s own views of 
when jurisdiction may be exercised.
Lord Collins found that notions of when jurisdiction to decide is appro-
priate were outside of the Model Law.26 He thus effectively held that all or-
ders and judgments entered by an insolvency court could be categorized 
either as based upon in personam or in rem jurisdiction.27 In personam judg-
ments reflected the court’s power to affect the personal liability of the liti-
gants; in rem judgments related to the litigant’s property.
21. Certificate of Serv. at 1–2, Roman, Ch. 11 Case No. 05-60155 (REG), Adv. No. 07-03138 
(REG), ECF No. 36.
22. Declaration of Paul Grove at 4, Roman, Ch. 11 Case No. 05-60155 (REG), Adv. No. 07-03138
(REG), ECF No. 42.
23. Roman, slip op. at 23 (“Because Defendants were served with the summons and complaint by 
personal delivery by process servers, in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 7004(a)(1), which incorporates 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) and 4(h), which incorporate The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents, 20 U.S.T. 361, service of process was sufficient.”).
24. Judgment at 4, Roman, Ch. 11 Case No. 05-60155 (REG), Adv. No. 07-03138 (REG), ECF No. 
46.
25. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [132], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from Eng.).
26. Id. [133]–[144].
27. Id. [102]–[105].
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In this scheme of things, Rubin held that judgments in clawback or 
avoiding powers actions are based upon in personam jurisdiction. Under 
United Kingdom common law, however, foreign judgments based on in per-
sonam jurisdiction cannot be enforced “unless the traditional common law 
principles governing the jurisdictional competence of the foreign court in 
respect of in personam orders (through presence in the jurisdiction or sub-
mission) or in rem orders (confined to assets in the jurisdiction) were satis-
fied.”28 As Eurofinance was not present in the United States, and had not 
submitted to jurisdiction there, the Supreme Court declined to recognize the 
authority of the United States judgment to establish Eurofinance’s in perso-
nam liability on the claims alleged.
The United Kingdom Supreme Court rested on distillations of the com-
mon law as applied to judgments from courts outside of the United King-
dom.29 An irony of the opinion is that the method of service of process 
used—physical delivery of papers to the registered office of a company—
would have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction and recognize the liability 
created by a default judgment had the matter arisen solely in the United 
Kingdom.30 Put another way, Rubin acknowledged the lack of reciprocity in 
methods of conferring jurisdiction.
As the court itself acknowledged:
[R]eciprocity has not played a part in the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments at common law. The English court does not concede 
jurisdiction in personam to a foreign court merely because the English 
court would, in corresponding circumstances, have power to order service 
out of the jurisdiction.31
Rubin did acknowledge that the common law could, and had been su-
perseded by legislation.32 But the Model Law did not qualify, and there were 
no other candidates, and so Rubin declined to recognize the New York 
court’s default judgment.
28. Nick Segal et al., Assistance to Foreign Insolvency Office-Holders in the Conflict of Laws: Is 
the Common Law Fit for Purpose?, INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 2017, at 117, 124.
29. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [7]–[8]. In particular, the court relied upon Rule 43 (formerly Rule 
36) as stated in 1 DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 689–90 (Lawrence Collins 
et al. eds., 15th ed. 2012), a treatise for which Lord Collins, the author of the principal judgment in Rubin,
was a contributor and editor.
30. See Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, r. 6.3(1)(c), 6.9 (Eng.).
31. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [127] (citation omitted). This language has been adopted almost word 
for word in Dicey. DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 191 (Lawrence Collins & 
Jonathan Harris eds., 15th ed. 4th Supp. 2017).
32. Id. [6] (indicating that with respect to companion case, prior statutory instrument would over-
ride common law rules (but noting that the statute substantially mirrored the common law rules)).
2018] INFINITE JEST 757
B. The Proposed Solution—Reciprocity
Rubin set off alarms with respect to the advance of universalism. No 
longer could parties be secure in their belief that the COMI court could ad-
judicate all matters relating to the insolvency. If a non-COMI court could 
challenge the COMI court’s insolvency jurisdiction on non-insolvency 
grounds, then the universalist goal of unified proceedings was in jeopardy.
UNCITRAL took note. It felt that Rubin and some other decisions had 
“led to uncertainty concerning the ability of some courts, in the context of 
recognition proceedings under the [Model Law], to recognize and enforce 
judgments given in the course of foreign insolvency proceedings, such as 
judgments issued in avoidance proceedings.”33
To address this uncertainty, UNCITRAL undertook to draft the Recog-
nition Law, a new convention related only to insolvency-related judgments. 
But how to address Rubin? The current response to is to take up the Supreme 
Court’s indication that common law rules can be altered by statute. As the 
Recognition Law would be a statute, all that remained would be the drafting 
of appropriate rules.
The Recognition Law addresses Rubin by choosing unified rules for 
recognition among insolvency and non-insolvency judgments. In other
words, reciprocity reigns. The Recognition Law attempts to achieve this rec-
iprocity through article 13(g). That article states that:
Subject to article 7 [public policy exception], recognition and en-
forcement of an insolvency-related foreign judgment may be refused if:
. . . .
(g) The originating court did not satisfy one of the following condi-
tions:
(i) The court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the explicit consent 
of the party against whom the judgment was issued;
(ii) The court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the submission of 
the party against whom the judgment was issued, namely that the defend-
ant argued on the merits before the court without contesting jurisdiction 
within the time frame provided in the law of the originating State, unless 
it was evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of juris-
diction would not have succeeded under that law;
(iii) The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis on which a court in 
this State could have exercised jurisdiction; or
(iv) The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis that was not [incon-
sistent] [incompatible] with the law of this State . . . .34
33. Recognition Draft Guide to Enactment, supra note 12, at 2.
34. Recognition Law, supra note 13, at 10–11 (second and third alterations in original).
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Key to the Rubin rejection is clause (iii). It incorporates a reciprocity 
notion. Paraphrased, it eliminates the ability to refuse recognition if, all other 
avenues of jurisdiction unavailing, the foreign court’s jurisdiction for its or-
der rests “on a basis on which a court in this State could have exercised ju-
risdiction.”
As noted above, this is a proposition Rubin explicitly rejected under 
English common law. Rubin held that reciprocity with respect to foreign in-
solvency judgments was neither recognized nor relevant. If the Recognition 
Law were adopted as a binding statute, however, future courts would have 
to ask if the basis of the foreign court’s assertion of jurisdiction—in Rubin’s 
case, the manner of service—could be a basis of the domestic court’s recog-
nition of its own judgments. That is, would stuffing the papers in the mail 
slot at Eurofinance have established jurisdiction over Eurofinance if the pro-
cess had issued out of an English court? If so, then recognition would follow.
II. LOST IN TRANSLATION—WHY RECIPROCITY WON’T WORK
Whatever the merits of merging recognition rules between domestic and 
foreign judgments may be, the incorporation of a reciprocity rule has several 
practical and theoretical problems.
A. Problems in Translation: Theory
The theoretical problems are akin to problems that arise in translation. 
Any rule incorporating reciprocity must assume that the type of order sought 
to be enforced is a type of order that the enforcing state can understand. Only 
if there is understanding can the enforcing court make a reasoned decision 
that the order sought to be enforced was issued in a manner consistent with 
the enforcing court’s own jurisprudence. By understanding, I mean compre-
hension not only of the words used, but the concepts behind the words used.
A problem with translation is that it rarely captures the exact meaning 
of a word or phrase, and thus there may be systemic indeterminacy over the 
correct selection of an isomorphic translation. This may be particularly true 
in technical and arcane areas such as insolvency law, but also is the case with 
ordinary language. Willard Van Orman Quine famously illustrated this con-
cept in Word and Object.35 In that work, Quine posits a linguist attempting 
to understand words in a language for which there is no competent or ready 
translation. Quine’s linguist spots a rabbit running by, and then hears a native 
speaker of the language utter “Gavagai.” The linguist could translate this to 
35. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 23–72 (new ed. 2013) (1960).
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“Lo, a rabbit.”36 That translation, however, does not exclude others. Depend-
ing on context, the utterance could mean “food on paws” or “Look at the 
time; I have to run” or “furry animal.”37 The means by which we could test 
which translation is correct would require the linguist to know all possible 
uses of “Gavagai.” And as Roger Gibson has noted, this problem is magni-
fied when the words connect to abstract ideas instead of direct sense experi-
ences. As he said:
Thus, translating some native utterance as, say, “Pelicans are our half-
brothers” is a much more contextual affair. It involves utilizing what 
Quine calls analytical hypothesis (i.e. hypotheses that go beyond all pos-
sible behavioral data.). . . . [Quine’s] claim is not that successful transla-
tion is impossible, but that it is multiply possible. The philosophical moral 
of indeterminacy of translation is that propositions, thought of as objec-
tively valid translation relations between sentences, are simply non-exist-
ent.38
Bankruptcy statutes provide this “multiply possible” sort of translation. 
As an example, imagine two countries where the citizens use words that most 
would translate to what English speakers would call a “lien.” Imagine further 
that although the words refer to property interests, they vary in whether the 
holder of the lien has a proceeds or after-acquired property interest, or 
whether she can assign her interest in the lien to another. In such cases, the 
enforcing court may not be able to determine whether the court system in 
which it sits would issue such an order: the words and concepts in the order 
sought to be recognized may be unknown, and thus the court cannot reach a 
principled decision as to whether it is the type of order it might issue.
Such differences may actually have parallels in reality. In the United 
States, for example, a security interest in collateral is created exclusively for 
the benefit of the secured creditor;39 in the United Kingdom, however, a 
36. Id. at 25.
37. Quine offers a few others:
For, consider ‘gavagai.’ Who knows but what the objects to which this term applies are not 
rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits? In either event the 
stimulus situations that prompt assent to ‘Gavagai’ would be the same as for ‘Rabbit.’ Or per-
haps the objects to which ‘gavagai’ applies are all and sundry undetached parts of rabbits; again 
the stimulus meaning would register no difference. When from the sameness of stimulus mean-
ings of ‘Gavagai’ and ‘Rabbit’ the linguist leaps to the conclusion that a gavagai is a whole 
enduring rabbit, he is just taking for granted that the native is enough like us to have a brief 
general term for rabbits and no brief general term for rabbit stages or parts.
Id. at 46.
38. Roger F. Gibson, Quine, in THE WORLD’S GREATEST PHILOSOPHERS 253, 258 (Robert L. Ar-
rington ed., 2003).
39. See U.C.C § 9-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (secured creditor receives all 
proceeds until debt is paid).
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small portion of certain after-arising floating charges have to be shared with 
unsecured creditors.40 The United States recognizes an endless chain of pro-
ceeds interests so long as the interest is identified;41 some civil law countries 
do not recognize certain proceeds interests after the first disposition.42 The
United States allows generic description of collateral43 and provisions that 
automatically grant security interests in collateral;44 other nations do not, and 
do not embrace expansive after-acquired property clauses.45
As a result, if an insolvency-related judgment places a “continuing lien” 
on all a debtor’s assets in, for example, a debtor-in-possession financing 
agreement, there will be translation problems as to the exact meaning of the 
lien creditor’s property interest if the judgment purports to extend to property 
found in a country that does not share the same conceptions of “lien.” Asking 
a court not sitting in the judgment’s country of origin to interpret such a 
judgment requires a leap of faith that there is enough in common between 
the law of the nation creating the judgment and the law of the country asked 
to recognize and enforce it.46
40. This is calculated as follows: Fifty percent of first realization up to £10,000 and twenty percent 
of £10,000 to £600,000 is paid to unsecured creditors with the balance going to the floating charge. See
Enterprise Act 2002, c. 40, § 252 (Eng.) (amending Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45 (Eng.), to add section 
176A); Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003, SI 2003/2097, ¶ 3 (Eng.).
41. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12) (definition of collateral to include all proceeds); id. § 9-315(a) (con-
tinuing nature of security interest in proceeds).
42. Heywood Fleisig et al., REFORMING COLLATERAL LAWS TO EXPAND ACCESS TO FINANCE 33, 
WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG], No. 37096 (2006), http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7100 
[https://perma.cc/4F92-NV5J] (noting that many civil law countries only permit proceeds interests to ex-
tend to first generation proceeds, and so proceeds of first generation proceeds are not encumbered with 
the initial lien).
43. See U.C.C. § 9-108.
44. See id. § 9-204(a).
45. See Fleisig et al., supra note 42, at 26–28.
46. The recent movie Arrival also contains an example of mistranslation. In the movie, aliens land 
on earth, and human scientists have to discover how to communicate with them. That leads to this ex-
change:
Col. Weber: I don’t want to take away from your success, but Dr. Banks, is it really the right 
approach? Try to teach them how to speak and read? That’s gonna take long.
Dr. Louise Banks: You’re wrong! Its faster.
Col. Weber: Everything you do here, I have to explain to a room full of men, whose first and 
last question is how can this be used against us. So you’ll have to give me more than that!
Dr. Louise Banks: Kangaroo.
Col. Weber: What is that?
Dr. Louise Banks: In 1770, Captain James Cook’s ship ran aground off the coast of Australia 
and led a party, where they found the aboriginal people. One of the sailors pointed to the animals 
that hop around and put their babies in their pouch, And he asked what they were. The Aborig-
ines said “kangaroo.”
Col. Weber: And your point is?
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This confusion can extend to issues regarding the conferring of juris-
diction as well. The United States, as well as England, generally recognizes 
service of process by mail or post. But there are wrinkles. If the defendant in 
the United States is an insured banking institution, there are special rules 
regarding the mandatory use of special types of mail and required forms of 
address on that mail.47 Does that mean, for example, that if the United States 
were to adopt the Recognition Law, that a United States court could decline 
to recognize a United Kingdom court’s assertion of jurisdiction over a United 
States bank (say, JP Morgan Chase or Citibank) operating in England and 
served there by regular mail? The problem is complicated in that the type of 
post required in the United States—certified mail—may not even exist in the 
United Kingdom.48
The general point is that reciprocity requires agreed equivalence of the 
concepts or rights to be reciprocated in order to determine whether recogni-
tion is appropriate. That may exist with simple judgments to pay money. But 
those judgments were never the target of the Recognition Law; there are 
presently well-understood measures for enforcements of such judgments.49
The same logic applies to judgments entered with the knowledge and consent 
of the defendant. When the issue is shifted to concepts or fundamental tenets 
of domestic insolvency law that may be unique or particular to a nation, how-
ever—such as those found in United States’ debtor-in-possession financ-
ing—the translation from one country to another may prove nettlesome.
Dr. Louise Banks: It wasn’t until later that they learned that “kangaroo” means “I don’t under-
stand.” So . . . I need this so that we don’t misinterpret things in there, otherwise it is going to 
take 10 times as long.
Col. Weber: I can sell that for now. But I need you to submit your vocabulary of words before 
the next session. Remember what happened to the Aborigines. A more advanced race, nearly 
wiped them out.
[Col. Weber leaves]
Ian Donnelly: It’s a good story.
Dr. Louise Banks: Thanks. It’s not true, but it proves my point.
ARRIVAL (Xenolinguistics 2016). The quotation can be found at: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Arri-
val_(film) [https://perma.cc/42V5-RUGF].
47. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(h) (with certain exceptions, “[s]ervice on an insured depository insti-
tution (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) in a contested matter or adversary 
proceeding shall be made by certified mail addressed to an officer of the institution”).
48. This of course assumes that no other means of recognition, such as consent, exist to recognize 
the judgment.
49. See generally Bruce A. Markell, Comity, Chapter 15, and the Enforcement of Foreign Country 
Money Judgments in the United States, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW 2015, at 697 (Janis P. 
Sarra & Barbara Romaine eds., 2016).
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B. Problems in Translation: Practical Problems
This translation problem can also be illustrated by practical means. 
Take again, for example, debtor-in-possession financing in the United 
States.50 In the forty years since the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 
debtor-in-possession financing agreements have taken a life of their own.51
In a recent case, In re Toys “R” Us, the main debtor-in-possession motion 
for financing comprises over 500 pages.52 It incorporated new liens,53 re-
leases, complicated funding conditions,54 and all sorts of specialty provisions 
developed over time in the United States, including the debtors’ concession 
on the validity of the lenders’ pre-petition claims and liens,55 a limit on other 
parties challenging those claims and liens,56 indemnification of all the 
lender’s agents,57 and carve outs from the lender’s security interests to pay 
estate professionals.58 The court granted interim59 and final approval60 to the 
agreement.
The agreement also purported to affect the assets and liabilities of non-
United States entities,61 even non-United States debtors. If the Recognition 
Law were applicable, how would a non-United States, civil law, non-English 
speaking court interpret such provisions? Say, for example, that one of the 
50. The main provision upon which such financing is made is 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Creditor Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Em-
pirical View, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 848; Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsoles-
cence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 104–05.
52. Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing the N. Am. Debtors to 
Obtain Postpetition Fin., (ii) Authorizing the N. Am. Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (iii) Granting Liens 
and Providing Superpriority Admin. Expense Status, (iv) Granting Adequate Prot. to the Prepetition 
Lenders, (v) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (vi) Scheduling a Final Hearing, & (vii) Granting Related 
Relief Filed, In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 17-34665 (KLP) (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2017), ECF No. 29 
[hereinafter DIP Motion]. The credit agreement itself consisted of 348 of the total 511 pages. Id. at 164–
511.
53. Id. at 19–21 (summary).
54. Id. at 13–14 (summary).
55. Id. at 15–18 (summary)
56. Id. at 15 (summary).
57. Id. at 21–22 (summary).
58. Id. at 11 (summary).
59. Interim Order (i) Authorizing the N. Am. Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Fin., (ii) Authorizing 
the N. Am. Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (iii) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Admin. 
Expense Status, (iv) Granting Adequate Prot. to the Prepetition Lenders, (v) Modifying the Automatic 
Stay, (vi) Scheduling a Final Hearing, & (vii) Granting Related Relief, In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 17-
34665 (KLP) (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2017), ECF No. 98.
60. Final Order (i) Authorizing the N. Am. Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Fin., (ii) Authorizing the 
N. Am. Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (iii) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Admin. Expense 
Status, (iv) Granting Adequate Protection to the Prepetition Lenders, (v) Modifying the Automatic Stay, 
(vi) Scheduling a Final Hearing, & (vii) Granting Related Relief, In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 17-34665 
(KLP) (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2017), ECF No. 711.
61. DIP Motion, supra note 52, at 19.
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lenders wished to foreclose upon the liens granted in the financing and 
sought to realize upon property located in Peru (which, for argument’s sake, 
assume was purchased by a Peruvian company from a Canadian affiliate of 
the debtor after the financing had been approved). Add to the complexity that 
the Peruvian entity counterclaimed for damages against agents of the lender, 
claims which (if brought in the United States) would be barred by the indem-
nification provision.
If the Peruvian court did not have a robust history of debtor-in-posses-
sion financing, or did not recognize indemnification of non-debtor parties in 
domestic insolvencies, or did not recognize indemnification when the party 
having to indemnify against its own acts was not personally notified with the 
proceedings leading to the order, how would it apply the reciprocity notion 
to determine recognition? The lender’s lawyers would have to engage in a 
series of remote hypotheticals, such as: if our country had a history of such 
insolvency financing, and if our statute was logically congruent with the 
United States’ statute, our country’s courts would have adopted the non-
unanimous view that a director has the benefit of this foreign order as against 
local claimants.
That, I suggest, is a hard sell for two reasons. First, even if the local law 
permitted post-petition financing, it might not have evolved to the point at 
which indemnifications and proceeds interests were common. So the deci-
sion for reciprocity would be a decision of first-instance, without concrete 
facts or a case in which to situate the relevant facts regarding financing that 
contains releases. That is the practical problem. It might be resolved by a 
resolute court not afraid to make decisions about bankruptcy law without a 
bankruptcy case in front of it.
I suspect that this practical problem partially arises, however, from the 
theoretical problem that the terms and provisions from the United States 
bankruptcy order simply do not translate uniquely into the domestic legal 
system in which the dispute arises. Unless the local court simply adopts 
United States law (and United States interpretations) as its own, there will 
be differences in the shape and function of the various provisions used. Dif-
ferent laws and local customs make for different lending agreements, and for 
gaps in understanding the terms used.
C. COMI and Court Autonomy
There is another aspect here, suggested by the very existence of differ-
ent laws and customs. To truly achieve seamless universalism, the court 
asked to recognize a foreign insolvency judgment based upon reciprocity 
would have to know and understand, and be able to compare its system to, 
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the insolvency system generating the order sought to be enforced. Short of 
provisions that are “manifestly contrary” to the public policy of the nation in 
which the order is sought to be recognized,62 this essentially reduces to treat-
ing the enforcing court as simply another court in the court system of the 
nation having the debtor’s center of main interests. It creates a sort of purga-
tory class of orders—orders which the court of recognition cannot know it 
would issue, but which are claimed to be within its powers, presented in an 
after-the-fact context. Moreover, these orders have been issued by courts 
over which the recognizing court system has no power or control. The im-
plications of the deference deserve more study.
CONCLUSION
Hamlet, when presented with the skull of Horatio, a former court jester, 
described the deceased as a “fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent 
fancy.”63 But of course, the lifeless skull belied the seemingly infinite nature 
of Horatio’s jests. People die; projects end.
The modified universalism of the Model Law may have met a similar 
limit in Rubin, but not from the content of the insolvency law of the country 
in which enforcement is sought, but from that country’s other laws, such as 
law regarding the enforcement of judgments generally. Although the Recog-
nition Law seeks to bridge this gulf by requiring recognition based upon rec-
iprocity in non-insolvency law—it requires enforcement of an insolvency-
related law if a court in country in which enforcement is sought could issue 
or recognize the type of judgment before it in similar circumstances—this 
may not be enough.
The variety of reciprocity applications assumes that the law of the place 
of enforcement is familiar with or understands something like the foreign 
order sought to be enforced. Given the wide disparity in sophistication of 
insolvency law and practice among nations, and given the lack of homoge-
neity of experience with or presence of certain concepts common in many 
insolvency related judgments in the United States and elsewhere, reciprocity 
may prove an otiose tool to achieve harmonization.
62. Recognition Law, supra note 13, at 7.
63. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 5, sc. 1.
